vortiwines.blogg.se - Reciept from imagecast voting machines

#Reciept from imagecast voting machines install#
#Reciept from imagecast voting machines android#
#Reciept from imagecast voting machines code#
#Reciept from imagecast voting machines windows#

Encourage voters to verify the human-readable votes on printout.As recommended by Dominion Voting Systems, use the supplemental method to validate hashes on applications, audit log exports, and application exports.Disable the “Unify Tabulator Security Keys” feature on the election management system and ensure new cryptographic keys are used for each election.Ensure all ImageCast X devices are subjected to rigorous pre- and post-election testing.Use separate, unique passcodes for each poll worker card.

#Reciept from imagecast voting machines install#

Use read-only media to update software or install files onto ImageCast X devices.

#Reciept from imagecast voting machines windows#

Close any background application windows on each ImageCast X device.Ensure carefully selected protective and detective physical security measures (for example, locks and tamper-evident seals) are implemented on all affected devices, including on connected devices such as printers and connecting cables.Ensure that ImageCast X and the Election Management System (EMS) are not connected to any external (i.e., Internet accessible) networks.Ensure compliance with chain of custody procedures throughout the election cycle.Ensure all affected devices are physically protected before, during, and after voting.Dominion Voting Systems reports to CISA that the above vulnerabilities have been addressed in subsequent software versions. Contact Dominion Voting Systems to determine which software and/or firmware updates need to be applied.An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to print an arbitrary number of ballots without authorization.ĬISA recommended the following recommendations as ‘mitigation’ measures: The authentication mechanism used by voters to activate a voting session on the tested version of ImageCast X is susceptible to forgery.An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to gain access to sensitive information and perform privileged actions, potentially affecting other election equipment. The authentication mechanism used by poll workers to administer voting using the tested version of ImageCast X can expose cryptographic secrets used to protect election information.

#Reciept from imagecast voting machines code#

An attacker with physical access may use this to gain administrative privileges on a device and install malicious code or perform arbitrary administrative actions.

The authentication mechanism used by technicians on the tested version of ImageCast X is susceptible to forgery.

An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to escalate privileges on a device and/or install malicious code.

Applications on the tested version of ImageCast X can execute code with elevated privileges by exploiting a system level service.

An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to spread malicious code to ImageCast X devices from the EMS.

The tested version of ImageCast X can be manipulated to cause arbitrary code execution by specially crafted election definition files.

#Reciept from imagecast voting machines android#

The tested version of ImageCast X allows for rebooting into Android Safe Mode, which allows an attacker to directly access the operating system.

The tested version of ImageCast X has a Terminal Emulator application which could be leveraged by an attacker to gain elevated privileges on a device and/or install malicious code.

An attacker could leverage this vulnerability to disguise malicious applications on a device.

The tested version of ImageCast X’s on-screen application hash display feature, audit log export, and application export functionality rely on self-attestation mechanisms.

The tested version of ImageCast X does not validate application signatures to a trusted root certificate.

The security vulnerabilities are listed below: The security vulnerabilities justify the concerns of election observers who pointed out that admin rights could be used to override security features and that the system could potentially be hijacked due to “spoofing.” It is important to go beyond the advisery document itself to get a clear picture of the vulnerability. The vulnerability overview lists nine different security concerns. The report states that the security advisery affects the following versions of the Dominion Voting Systems ImageCast X software are known to be affected (other versions were not able to be tested): ImageCast X firmware based on Android 5.1, as used in Dominion Democracy Suite Voting System Version 5.5-A and ImageCast X application Versions 5.5.10.30 and 5.5.10.32, as used in Dominion Democracy Suite Voting System Version 5.5-A.